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Hate Speech
C. Edwin Baker*
Given the evils of hate, any argument for protecting is, at best, an uphill effort and, at
worst, simply misguided. Many people either accept or, at least, wonder whether they should
accept, an argument that goes something like this:
Anyone sensitive to the horror of genocide knows that hate pervades the atmosphere at
such times. Few goals can rank higher than preventing genocide and the murderous
racial conflicts presented to the world during the twentieth century. Moreover, it is
difficult to find any value in the freedom to engage in racist hate speech. Important but
ultimately less significant values such as free speech cannot, for any sensitive person,
lead to any pause in outlawing the speech that contributes to these horrors. Whether or
not the ban will be effective in even a few cases at preventing genocide or racial
violence, the mere possibility that it will more than justifies the ban.
As an advocate of almost absolute protection of free speech, I should explain the grounds
for my valuation of free speech and rejection of the above claim. That explanation, it turns out,
is too ambitious for this essay. Nevertheless, Part I describes but does not defend a theory of
why racist or hate speech should be protected – a theory that I believe provides the best, though
often unrecognized, explanation of existing American case law but one that is surely a
controversial, probably minority, view even in the United States.
Most readers will realize, as do I, that these theoretical grounds do not really answer my
imagined proponent of regulation. Thus, Part II describes the empirical evidence that would
cause me to abandon the theory described in Part I, at least in the context of some category of
racist or hate speech, but then gives reasons to doubt that this evidence will be forthcoming. In
the end, this essay is more a call for more knowledge – I stand ready to be shown that the
relevant evidence overrides my doubts about the efficacy of suppression.
But given the inevitable empirical uncertainties in evaluating such evidence, Part II does
not answer the last sentence of the imagined argument for regulation set forth above about the
mere possibility of making a contribution toward prevention. Thus, the final part of this essay
offers a different answer: it considers reasons to expect, as a practical matter, that hate speech
regulation is more likely to contribute to genocidal events and major events of racial violence
than to reduce them. These historical horrors help justify, or so I suggest, greater protection for
speech. My hypothesis is that the empirical investigation supports the gamble that strong speech
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protection leads to better results.
Before beginning, however, I offer the following preface. Constantly, references to
‘American exceptionalism’ are made in discussions of free speech. Usually the suggestion is
that the United States is extremely protective of free speech, disregarding most contrary values,
while Europeans, although generally protective of core speech freedoms, have a margin of
appreciation that also recognize other important values that it considers in determining the extent
of protection of speech – basically an approach Americans call ‘balancing.’ This suggestion of
difference is, at best, overblown. First, in many contexts many Europeans favor – including
some Justices on the European Court of Justice – something close to what has been portrayed as
the strongly speech-protective American position. For example, a 2004 decision of the
Hungarian Constitutional Court, followed its earlier 1992 decision in repeatedly invoking the
American ‘clear and present danger’ test in finding unconstitutional a law that punished speech
provoking racial hate.1 In contrast, many if not most American First Amendment scholars and
courts favor ‘balancing’ that is quite like what is portrayed as the European approach.2
Moreover, though some Americans – I am one – favor the strongly speech-protective
approach identified with American exceptionalism, that approach has been in the United States a
’fighting faith’ that often has not (yet) prevailed. Admittedly, the last half of the twentieth
century saw generally increasing protection of speech in America. Still, earlier in the twentieth
century, American courts regularly approved limits, jailing or fining people for their speech
activities. All sorts of expression have been prohibited and punished – speech favoring
socialism, communism, anarchism,3 and an even more mainstream political editorial;4 racist
*Versions of this paper were presented at conferences on Hate Speech at Cardozo Law School (November 2005)
and the Central European University (April 2006). I received helpful comments from many people but particularly
Peter Molnar and Monroe Price.
1

Hungarian Constitutional Court, Decision 18/2004 (v.25) AB, available at:
http://www.mkab.hu/content/en/en3/09360304.htm (visited 23 Sept 2007)

2

Virtually all First Amendment opinions of Chief Burger or Justice Powell adopt a form of balancing, which has
received one of its best defenses in Steven H. Shiffrin, The First Amendment, Democracy, and Romance
(Cambridge, Ma: Harvard U. Press, 1990), an approach that would probably require reversal of many of the great
modern First Amendment opinions in which no hint of balancing occurs. See Baker, Harm, Liberty, and Free
Speech, 70 So. Calif. L.Rev. 979 (1997)
3
See cases described in Zachariah Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the United States (Cambridge, MA: Harvard U.
Press, 1964), especially chap. 2, 36-107.
4
An editorial cartoon criticizing political corruption was the basis for a fine, with the court refusing to hear the
publisher’s offer to prove its truth. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907)
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speech5 or sexually explicit speech;6 publication and sale of great novels,7 feminist materials
important for sex education;8 labor picketing9 and public assemblies.10 And to this day, the First
Amendment, which applies only to governmental not private activity, does not protect people
from being fired by private employers for their speech or political associations.
Interestingly, putting aside official legal doctrine, some political scientists have
concluded that in practice as opposed to rhetoric the United States is not exceptional in the way
these comments suggest. The impression of one commentator is that, as ‘compared to nine
European democracies, the U.S. has imposed the most severe legal and social “obstacles to
political dissent.”’11 Later this chapter will raise doubts about causal claims. Still, I cannot help
wondering if the extraordinarily sad state not only of American foreign policy but also of
domestic policies, which have left the U.S. with greater income inequality than any other
industrialized democratic country, reflects in part the historically inadequate protection of
speech freedom in the United States. How would our politics have gone if we had not
suppressed labor activists from early in our history, the liberal internationalists during or after
World War I, or wiped progressive thinkers out of the universities and cultural industries during
the McCarthy period, a cleansing that took decades to repair? Much of Zachariah Chafee’s
classic book on free speech can be read as supporting his speculative comment that greater
respect for free speech at the time of World War I might have lead to a better treaty after the
5

Beauharnais v. Ill. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
Roth v. United States,. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
7
Courts upheld, for example, bans on Theodore Drieser, American Tragedy in 1930, Lillian Smith, Strange Fruit in
1945, Edmund Wilson, Memories of Hecate County in 1947, Erskine Caldwell, God’s Little Acre in 1950. See T. I.
Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 468-70 (New York: Random House, 1970). Beyond the judicial
approval of censorship of specific books was, of course, the effect of this potential on what was written and deleted.
This censorhip of great – as well as not so great – literature in the United States is well and exhaustively described
in Edward de Grazia, Girls Lean Back Everywhere (New York: Random House, 1992).
8
Most faqmous is Margaret Sanger’s persecution under the Comstock laws for trying to circulate birth control
information. Margaret A. Blanchard, ‘The American Urge to Censor: Freedom of Expression Versus the Desire to
Sanitize,’ 33 William and Mary L.Rev. 741, 766-78 (1992).
9
Giboney v. Empire Storage Co, 336 U.S. 490 (1949); Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950);
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284 (1957).
10
A conviction for public speaking in a public place were famously affirmed by Justice Holmes in the now
discredited decision of Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510 (1895), aff’d 167 U.S. 43 (1897) and later echoed
in decisions such as Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (upholding ordinance that prohibited picketing near a
courthouse, though reversing conviction because of selective application of statute against defendants) and
Adderley v Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (upholding conviction for peacefully demonstrating outside a county jail). .
11
R. J. Goldstein, Political Repression in Modern America: From 1870 to the Present (Cambridge, Mass:
Schenkman, 1978) xiv, quoting R. Dahl, Political Oppositions in Western Democracies xvi, 390-92 (New Haven:
Yale U. Press, 1968).
6
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war, to support in the United States for the League of Nations, and to ‘save[ing] English children
from German bombs in 1941.’12 In any event, though prominent advocates of rather absolutist
speech freedom may come from American scholars and jurists, identifying that position with an
American and contrasted with a European reality is exaggerated. Still, relatively absolutist
protection is the view that my comments endorse.

I
My premises are: (i) that the legitimacy of the state depends on its respect for people’s
equality and autonomy and (ii) that as a purely formal matter, the state only respects people’s
autonomy if it allows people in their speech to express their own values – no matter what these
values are and irrespective of how this expressive content harms other people or makes
government processes or achieving governmental aims difficult. Achievement of more
substantive aims, such as helping people experience fulfillment and dignity, must occur with a
legal structure that as a formal matter respects people’s equality and autonomy.
The conception of autonomy that the state must respect is, as noted, in a sense formal not
substantive. 13 A legal order must ascribe autonomy to people generally, usually withdrawing
this attribution only for the extent of involvement in institutional structures frameworks steered
by mechanisms other than communication and a person’s choices. The state cannot coherently
ask a person to obey its laws unless it treats the person of capable of making choices for herself,
for example, the choice to obey the law.14 As so conceived, respect for a person’s autonomy is
in general an on/off value. A government regulation either is or is not consistent with the
required respect. A person is not treated as formally autonomous if the law denies her the right
to use her own expression to embody her views. As used here, formal autonomy has an activity
or choice, not a result or resource-oriented focus. (I have gone further and argued that she also
must have a general right over the value-expressive uses of herself – her own body – but that
raises interpretive difficulties not necessary to examine here.) Moreover, meeting the

12

Chafee (note xx), at xiii, 561-62.
C. E. Baker, ‘Autonomy and Informational Privacy or Gossip: The Central Meaning of the First Amendment’
(2004) 21 Soc.Phil.& Pol'y 215 (2004).
14
Seeing the law this way represents the most important transformative element of H.L.A. Hart’s transformation of
positivism. See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, originally
published 1961); C. Edwin Baker, Hart’s Transformation of Positivism (ms, 2007).
13
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requirement of respecting her choice autonomy, granting this expressive right, creates no actual
or even potential conflict with respect for others’ formal autonomy, that is, no conflict with
recognizing their equivalent choice or expressive rights with respect to their body or speech.
Law’s respect for formal autonomy of one person never denies respect for the formal autonomy
(or, for that matter, the formal equality) of another.
In contrast to respect for a person’s formal autonomy as an absolute requirement of legal
legitimacy, a central aim of a democratic state should be to promote people’s substantive
autonomy. Substantive autonomy involves a person’s actual capacity and opportunities to lead
the best, most meaningful, self-directed life possible. Laws that advance one person’s
substantive autonomy – by allocating resources to her or providing her information, for example
– often reduce the substantive autonomy of another person. In making policy choices, a state is
properly influenced but not controlled by substantively egalitarian aims, welfare maximizing
considerations, and various inevitably non-neutral collective self-definitional or majoritarian
values. These policy or legal choices, as compared to others the state might make, inevitably
favor some people’s substantive autonomy over that of others.
Democratic legitimacy, I believe, and certainly the civil libertarian commitment, requires
that, in advancing people’s substantive autonomy as well as in advancing substantive egalitarian
aims and other proper policy goals, the legal order neither have the purpose to nor use general
means that disrespect people’s formal autonomy (or their formal equality). On this view, respect
for free speech is a proper constraint on the choice of collective or legal means to advance
legitimate policy goals. Typically racist hate speech embodies the speaker’s at least momentary
view of the world and, to that extent, expresses her values. Of course, her speech does not
respect others’ equality or dignity. It is not, however, her but the state’s legitimacy that is at
stake in evaluating the content of the legal order. Law’s purposeful restrictions on her racist or
hate speech violate her formal autonomy, while her hate speech does not interfere with or
contradict anyone else’s formal autonomy even if her speech does cause injuries that sometimes
include undermining others’ substantive autonomy. For this reason, prohibitions on racist or
hate speech should generally be impermissible – even if arguably permissible in special, usually
institutionally bound, limited contexts where the speaker has no claimed right to act
autonomously – such as when, as an employee, she has given up her autonomy in order to meet
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role demands that are inconsistent with expressions of racism..
Admittedly, other influential theories of free speech could lead to different conclusions –
or different explanations for similar conclusions. Pragmatic balancers are likely to treat the
notion of formal autonomy as incoherent or lacking moral appeal and instead seek to advance
people’s substantive autonomy, possibly in a roughly egalitarian manner, or to advance other
substantive goals. Undoubtedly, the mere expression of racist hate speech can cause real injuries
and has the potential to stimulate further harms. As will be noted below, however, those
disparaged by hate speech might well be better off without legal restrictions on the speech.
Without offering any sympathy for the racists, the pragmatic balancer could plausibly come out
on either side in this debate about legal restrictions on hate speech.15
Equally interesting is a more foundational approach to free speech. Some view free
speech guarantees as a necessary implication of democracy – with the scope of protection limited
by its rationale.16 To many thoughtful observers, this democratic basis for the protected legal
status of speech suggests justifiable restrictions on at least some racist hate speech. The
assertion is that racist speech contradicts the democratic premise – an equality in being selfgoverning – that justifies protection of speech. For example, hate speech that portrays a
particular group as unfit to participate in the governing process or that advocates crimes against
members of a particular group rejects basic premises of democracy. The critique observes that
the hate speech does not take a position within democratic discourse but rather aims at thwarting
democracy and democracy’s discourses by means of actual or expressive exclusion. For this
reason, it is argued, hate speech can be prohibited.
In the past, a number of jurists have accepted roughly the above view – arguing that antidemocratic speech is permissibly prohibited. Judge Learned Hand treated counseling or
advocacy of law violation as inconsistent with the democratic methods of change and, therefore,
properly made illegal.17 Justice Felix Frankfurter explained that communists’ speech ranked low
on any scale of values.18 Presumably the low ranking occurred because the communists

15

S. H. Shiffrin, Dissent, Injustice, and the Meaning of America 49-87 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press),
1999).

16

A. Meiklejohn, Political Freedom: The Constitutional Powers of the People (New York: Harper, 1960)
See Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten 244 Fed. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
18
See Dennis v. United States 341 US 494 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
17
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recommended change by non-democratic means; for that reason, their speech was not ‘political’
within Frankfurter’s understanding of democratic practice. Robert Bork likewise denied that
advocacy of law violation – for example advocacy of revolution or even peaceful civil
disobedience – could be ‘political speech,’ which is the only category that he would protect.19 At
mid-century, Carl Auerbach argued that the basic postulate behind the First Amendment allows
Congress to ‘exclude from the struggle,’ to restrict the speech, of ‘those groups which, if
victorious, would crush democracy and impose totalitarianism.’20 Such arguments could apply
equally to racist hate speech, at least to the extent the speech rejects the premise of democratic
inclusion.
Others argue, however, that this conclusion does not follow, at least does not follow for
‘our’ (meaning the American) particular version of democracy.21 They claim that all speech, no
matter how disrespectful of others, that is part of public discourse, merits protection, possibly
absolute protection. Even if emphatic about locating the basis of free speech in democracy, ‘our’
conception of democracy often seems premised on people’s autonomously arriving at their own
political views – that is, arriving at their views without legal restriction on the public discourse
leading to those views. A person must be able to explore (advocate or hear) even views
inconsistent with democracy in order to formulate her own commitments – although this strong
protection of speech applies only to speech that is part of public discourse, which seemingly
covers only speech evocative of possible public issues and which is part of a possible public
sphere or public discourse.
This view has undeniable strengths both interpretatively and normatively and may very
well reach the same conclusion about most regulation of hate speech as does my emphasis on
formal autonomy. Still, unlike a theory grounded on respect for individual autonomy, this
democratic approach does not cover protection to speech not characterized as part of public
19

R. Bork, ‘Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems’ (1971) 47 Ind. L. Rev. 1, 20, 29-31. At about
the time of publication, Bork in a lecture given at Yale Law School, he argued, as I remember it, for an even more
restrictive interpretation of the scope of political speech.
20
C.A. Auerbach, ‘The Communist Control Act of 1954’ (1956) 23 U. Chi. L. Rev. 173, 189.
21
R.C. Post, ‘Hate Speech’ [this volume]; id., Constitutional Domains (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ, Press,
1995), 119-178; J. Weinstein, ‘Hate Speech, Viewpoint Neutrality, and the American Concept of Democracy’, in T.
Hensley (ed.), Boundaries of Free Expression & Order in American Democracy (Kent, Oh. (check): Kent State
Univ. Press, 2001)146-69 ; id., ‘Hate Speech and Democracy’ [this volume].
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discourse. (Interestingly, though for different reasons, both the autonomy and the democratic
discourse approaches either completely or largely deny protection to ‘commercial speech.’) My
theoretical objection to this view relates to its initial premise – that we should protect speech
fundamentally because the protection is essential to democracy or, more precisely, to the
conception of democracy that we accept. My question is why are we so concerned with
democracy? Why does democracy provide a foundational premise? (The strategy of my
question is the expectation that any sound normative answer to this inquiry will both explain the
proper contours of democracy and show that an explanation of the nature and significance of
democracy’s contribution to the legitimacy of the legal order requires and reflects acceptance of
value premises that go beyond the structure of the political order to matters such as protection of
even non-political self-expression.)
One response could attempt to avoid the normative question and merely say – perhaps for
the United States but maybe not those European countries that restrict hate speech – that we are
not only in fact deeply committed to democracy but also that our conception of democracy
requires virtually complete citizen autonomy within public discourse. This essentially
sociological response, however, leaves two problems. First, it does not answer the skeptic, the
person who wonders why we should be committed to democracy, particularly our conception of
democracy, especially given ‘the sheer stupidity of the policies of this nation.’22 Second, even
more fundamentally, to the extent that we do in fact adopt laws punishing hate speech – even if
invalidated by courts – it seems that our conception of democracy is at least contested. It even
seems that, in the view of the majority, our conception of democracy is more like the one that
Justice Frankfurter and Judge Hand describe than the one Professors Post and Weinstein
propose. They may be right but they need a normative, not merely sociological, rationale for
their position.
Instead of the contextual sociological claim, I have argued that the best answer to this
normative question of what it is about democracy that justifies our allegiance is that democracy
is the only political order that embodies a normative principle of equal respect for people’s right
to be engaged in self-determination when self-determination occurs at the group level, leads to

22

A. Mieklejohn, ‘The First Amendment Is an Absolute’[1961] Supreme Court Review 245, 263.
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legal allocation of resources, and involves coercion – that is, is the only form of government that
respects people as free and equal in the process of choosing laws. But if legitimacy (or the
justification of legal obligation) requires respect for people’s right of self-determination, there is
no reason why this required respect applies only when people act to decide about the collective
but not when they act to decide about themselves. If this is right, the fundamental status of each
person’s equality and autonomy provides both the normative basis for democracy and a set of
normative principles that democratic laws must not violate. These values both require
democracy and require limits on democracy. The logic of this rationale for democracy does not
so much place free speech at the center of democracy but rather locates democracy as an offshoot of respect for free speech or, more specifically, respect for individual autonomy (and
equality). Respect for ascribed autonomy is both definitive of, and a restriction on, the scope of
both free speech and democracy. Thus, I reject an emphasis on democratic foundations for free
speech in favor of this more basic premise of respect for individual’s autonomy to which the law
must conform even as it pursues practices that favor people’s substantive autonomy. On this
basis, the legal order must respect the autonomy even of the individual who would deny such
respect to others in the community – the law must respect the freedom of the racist to express her
views.

II
Abstract theory is fine. But a convincing case that a different approach to free speech
might prevent occurrences such as the holocaust, more recent genocides like that in Rwanda, or
the other virulent, murderous racist practices would lead me – and I suppose any person of good
will – to revise abstract commitments that counsel against legal prohibitions of racist speech. So
the natural question is: what evidence or argument would such a convincing case require?
First, historical evidence should be available. But then the question becomes: what
specific historical evidence should be tellingly relevant to us today? Germany’s experience with
Nazism is often noted in explaining their current prohibitions on hate speech but it is less clear
that this history shows that these prohibitions are now needed. Historical accounts might find
that racist hate speech prominent in periods leading up to the genocide. But that finding would
clearly not be enough. It would not show whether this speech was causal or merely
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symptomatic, maybe even usefully symptomatic (in exposing a problem that needed to be dealt
with), of deeper underlying forces. And it would not show whether, even if causal in that
historical context, it would be so under different historical conditions – for example, the
conditions that exist in modern democracies. Moreover, even if historically causal and
potentially causal again, racist speech takes many forms and occurs in many contexts. Thus, the
account would need to show, in addition, that the specific hate speech that proposed legal
regulations would effectively prevent was at least a contributing cause of virulent racist or
genocidal practices. Support for this last empirical issue – that the restriction would be effective
in dealing with the particularly relevant racist speech – will be much harder than a showing of
correlation or even cause. Or, alternatively, the account could be convincing in some other way
– possibly by showing that the symbolism implicit in the speech prohibitions would be effective
at combating racism – again a difficult claim to make with confidence. (Many countries that
have experienced the worst racist violence have, in fact, had such prohibitions without
successfully preventing racist or genocidal results.23)
Still, even in the absence of good empirical evidence, a causal claim about racist hate
speech – at least as a contributing cause within a longer chain of causation – seems plausible.
Genocide or virulent racial discrimination presumably reflects attitudes. It is difficult to
understand how such attitudes could first arise and then persist if not in some way embodied in
people’s communications, their expression. Of course, such expression is unlikely to arise out of
nothing. Material conditions and social orientations that are not themselves equivalent to the
expression of racism are also likely to be a central part of the causal chain. If so, the question
becomes where in this causal chain, where in its fight against virulent racism, should a legal
order target its intervention(s)?
The seriousness of the evil surely justifies multiple interventions if their multiplicity
increases the likelihood of favorable outcomes. Still, pragmatically to justify hate speech
regulation seems to require that the following be shown:
(i) hate speech occurs in cases of genocide or virulent racial discrimination – a
demonstration that usually, maybe always can be made;
(ii) as a causal matter, hate speech – or, more specifically, the hate speech that would be
23

I was told at the conferences where this paper was presented that both Rwanda and Germany are examples.
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outlawed by hate speech regulation – contributes to these evils. The more general
version of this claim is probably right, although the more specific claim about the
specific hate speech that would be barred is considerably more speculative. Evidence on
the point is seldom offered and, I suspect, any offering would seldom be fully
convincing.
Even if these two points are right, the argument for legal prohibitions also requires persuasive
support for the following additional claims:
(iii) legal prohibitions of hate speech would actually be an effective place (even if not the
exclusive place) to intervene in the causal chain: I have seen little empirical evidence
supporting this claim. Below I will suggest doubts that this argumentative burden can be
met;
(iv) these legal bars on hate speech would not reduce the efficaciousness or likelihood of
other (legal or social) interventions that would be more effective in preventing virulent
racist acts; or, at least, that any negative effects would not be greater than any benefits the
bars on hate speech provide; and
(v) enactment of the hate speech prohibitions will not have other ‘costs’ – unrelated to
race but possibly related to the extent or nature of democracy and to human freedom –
that are greater than the net benefits of these means in comparison with or in addition to
other means for combating daunting racial evils.
An assessment of these five essentially empirical matters is crucial. I will put aside the fifth,
assume the first two arguendo, and focus on the third and fourth.
The third point requires two doubtful claims. It must assume that political forces will be
able to secure adoption and adoption of the needed prohibitions on hate speech in those
situations where the prohibitions are needed and could be causally effective as a means to
prevent virulent racism or genocide. Clearly, many places in the modern world have adopted
such prohibitions. The possibility is real, however, that the prohibitions will be adopted and
enforced only in places where not needed. Still, maybe the proper purpose of international
conventions requiring their adoption is precisely to add to the political pressure to adopt such
restrictions, thereby increasing the likelihood of their adoption where needed.
Even more problematic, to be an effective place to intervene, adopted prohibitions must
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be efficacious in reducing the likelihood of serious racist evils. Most obviously, this result
probably requires sufficient enforcement of the prohibitions against the relevant targets. Maybe,
however, their mere adoption could help create a cultural climate where racist speech, and even
more importantly, virulent racist practices, are unacceptable. The question of whether to expect
effective enforcement is made more difficult because it is not clear at what stage enforcement
would be meaningful in preventing the polity from devolving in an unacceptably racist direction
or whether enforcement could be effective at reversing cultural directions. Active enforcement
(against appropriate targets) is likely only if racist groups have not become too established. By
the time Nazis were gaining power, or during the year immediately preceding the genocide in
Rwanda, effective enforcement was unlikely. At the relevant time, enforcement would likely
either be blocked, create a backlash against the enforcers and sympathy for the ‘suppressed’
racists, or as will be discussed below, enforced primarily against ‘unpatriotic’ or ‘racist’ speech
of those most needing protection – Jews or Tutsis, for example, or against African-Americans in
the United States or Algerians in France.
Thus, the hope of those favoring hate speech prohibitions must be that enforcement will
be meaningful and effective at a quite early stage. Pessimism about this speculative hope seems
justified. First are generic doubts about the likelihood of effective legal enforcement. More
important, however, is the likelihood that at this most relevant stage the speech that meaningfully
contributes to developing or sustaining racism will be subtle, quotidian and, to many people,
seemingly inoffensive or at least not ‘seriously’ offensive speech. This speech is likely to fly
under the legal radar screen and, in any event, meaningful enforcement of prohibitions against
this speech is even less likely. Thus, even given a belief that racist speech contributes
significantly to virulent racism and genocidal practice, my hypothesis is that at earlier stages
legal prohibitions will not cover or be effectively enforced against the most relevant speech and
at later stages enforcement will not occur, will be counter-productive in creating martyrs for a
racist cause, or will focus on the wrong targets.
Even if there is reason to doubt the effectiveness of legal prohibitions in preventing the
reign of racist practices, the horrific evil feared (as well as the noxious quality of speech properly
covered by a prohibition) recommend that error should be on the side of caution. Here is where
the fourth point about possible negative effects of restrictions on hate speech, preliminarily
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suggested by some comments above, is crucial. Caution is often given as a reason to prohibit
hate speech. This reason, however, depends crucially on rejecting two further real empirical
possibilities: (i) that the prohibitions themselves will contribute to the racist nature of society and
(ii) that adoption of hate speech prohibitions will make other, more effective interventions
against the development of a racist, genocidal culture or polity less likely or less effective. Of
course, the opposite empirical results are possible. Advocacy of and then adoption of hate
speech prohibitions and pressure for their enforcement could invigorate an anti-racist politics
that makes other, maybe even more significant interventions, more likely. This scenario is,
however, at best questionable. And, if the first possibility turns out to be true, adoption of hate
speech prohibitions could contribute to the evil outcomes that a country must try to prevent.
That is, official legal suppression of ‘evil’ speech could generate the very evil that motivates
suppression.
Given these alternative empirical possibilities, the debate is not between idealistic but
uncaring ‘liberal’ defenders of free speech and fierce opponents of the worst forms of racism.
Rather the pragmatic debate is about different empirical predictions concerning the most
effective strategy for opposing racism. Empirical evidence of which scenario is most likely
should be welcome. Maybe the evidence exists, thought I do not know of it at a level where
confidence on a particular conclusion is warranted. Thus, Part III describes considerations
supporting the empirical hypothesis that speech prohibition will actually exacerbate racist
practice. Finally, if the issue remains in doubt, I will consider which direction merits our
gamble.
Before engaging in that discussion, however, I will describe an example of when such an
exacerbation hypothesis was invoked in a judicial decision. In the late 1940s and early 1950s,
the United States prosecuted leaders of the Communist Party for what could be benignly
characterized as advocating (teaching), or conspiracy to teach, the necessity and propriety of
violent means to achieve a proletarian dictatorship (though without any relevant evidence, some
Justices gave the speech at issue a more malignant characterization). When their convictions
were affirmed by the Supreme Court in Dennis v. United States, Justice Douglas in dissent
powerfully asserted:
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Communism on the world scene is no bogeyman; but Communism as a political faction
or party in this country plainly is. Communism has been so thoroughly exposed in this
country that it has been crippled as a political force. Free speech has destroyed it as an
effective political party.24 (emphasis added).

Essentially Douglas’ account claims ‘exceptionalism’ for the American response to
communism. The claim is implicitly two-fold: that the American response was to rely on free
speech and that this response was more effective than other responses tried elsewhere in the
world. Unfortunately, specifics of Douglas historical account and causal claim are either
doubtful or much too simplistic. Nevertheless, Douglas illustrates the logic of a view that
favoring free speech provides a central aspect of the best response to a major evil to which
objectionable speech is said to contribute. Crucially, nothing in Douglas’s argument for
allowing the expression of evil views counsels neutrality toward or even toleration of those
objectionable revolutionary views. The same lack of toleration even more obviously applies to
the expression of racial hatred. Nothing about legally allowing the speech – either in the Dennis
case or in the hate speech context – suggests that the views expressed do not present a serious
threat to the existence of an acceptable world. Rather, the pragmatic claim is that to allow
people the option to express their dreadful views is less dangerous than to attempt to outlaw this
expression.

III
Finally, consider reasons that hate speech prohibitions are likely to backfire. My
hypothesis has two reciprocal prongs. First, as an empirical matter, my suspicion is that the
prohibitions will not be effective at reducing the chances of horrendous results. That point has
been discussed above. Second, also as an empirical matter, my suspicion is that prohibitions on
hate speech will actually exacerbate problems, will increase the likelihood of horrendous results.
I consider six interrelated points that suggest this hypothesis.
First, prohibitions on hate speech may divert energy from and dampen the sense of
necessity of the more vital activity of responding expressively to and critiquing racist views.
24

Dennis v. United States 341 US 494, 588 (1951)
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Prohibitions, to the extent that they take overt expression of racism out of public discourse,
create a danger about which John Stuart Mill warned. Without people having the experience of
responding to and opposing expressions of misguided views, truth is in danger of becoming
sterile dogma, ineffective for good because people will have lost the ability to justify and explain
the truth when challenged.25 This point – the need for any noxious doctrine that exists within a
community to be publicly expressed and then persuasively rejected – was probably the
underlying lessen offered by Justice Douglas’ account of the discursive defeat of communism in
the United States.
Here is a place to repeat the point that, even if human rights, including the right of
everyone to express her views no matter how horrifying, require rejecting legal prohibitions of
hate speech, this legal toleration does not imply neutrality or complacence toward the evil views.
Neutrality or social toleration is the opposite of what society needs. In any free discussion – or
in wide-open debate where speech may be ‘vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly
sharp’ in its attacks26– conversational partners (or political opponents) should be committed to
each being able to express her view. But the response of the other can be: ‘no, your view is
entirely unacceptable, it is wrong for the following reasons, and I will do everything within my
(legal) power to prevent it from being realized.’ Despite conservative objections, people should
seek political correctness, like all forms of correctness. Of course, ideal responses to the people
whom a person believes is offering evil counsels is a subject too extensive to take up here, but I
should note that I am hardly recommending retributivist responses or denial of rights. Still, to
the extent they are able, people should reject, not tolerate, evil counsels and evil endeavors.
Specifically, people should condemn the racist expression and react accordingly to the people
who purvey it.
As an empirical hypothesis, I suggest that more active (and thus more effective)
opposition to racist views is likely to come from social practices of not tolerating racist
expression than from laws making it illegal. People in positions of power or authority do and
should lose their influence, and often even their position of authority, for public or exposed

25
26

J.S. Mill, On Liberty, chap. 2 (originally published 1859).
New York Times v. Sullivan 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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private racist expression. Society should be and apparently is prepared to maintain strong social
norms rejecting racist viewpoints. I fear, however, that such social practices would be weakened
by, and even replaced by laws prohibiting racist expression. Legal prosecutions focus on the
wrong issues – legal requirements, legal line drawing, propriety of prosecution of this rather than
other cases. In any minimally decent society that legally permits hate speech, such expression of
hate reflexively creates, for those who object to racism, a platform to explain and justify their
objections. This expressive activity may provide the greatest safeguard against racist cultures
and polities. In contrast, repression creates a platform for racists to claim victim-hood and to
appeal to the many who value liberty to oppose the suppression of their freedom, shearing off the
energy of a significant group from the chorus that condemns the racist views.
Second is a closely related point. By causing racism to (largely) go underground, speech
prohibitions are likely to obscure the extent of the problem and the location or the human or
social carriers of the problem, thereby reducing both the perceived necessity and the likely
effectiveness of opposition to racism. My experience has been that among those people who are
likely targets of hate speech but who still favor free speech, the reason most often given for
favoring speech is the advantage of ‘knowing the enemy.’ Knowledge of the existence, views,
and, importantly, the identity of those with racist attitudes increases the capacity of those
potentially subject to racist harms to protect themselves and to make meaningful rhetorical,
strategic, political and legal responses.
Third, speech prohibitions can increase (or create) racist individuals’ or groups’ sense of
oppression and, thereby, their rage and belief that they must act. There is an empirical issue of
whether prohibitions on racist speech do more to prevent than to fan the development of racist
attitudes. I only speculate here, but I suggest that the causes are deeper and the prohibitions may
do little. If this suggestion is right, the primary immediate effect of the speech prohibition may
be simply to suppress (or to attempt to suppress) people’s expression of their racist views. The
primary dynamic consequence of suppression is to outrage and alienate those suppressed. They
reasonably experience the majority (that is, those who back the law) and the legal order as
specifically denying their basic rights, their right to express their truthfully held views in the
public sphere (or in whatever contexts the specific law applies) while everyone else has this
freedom. For this reason, they may conclude, they can no longer accord allegiance to (or view
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as legitimate) this legal order. That is, the prohibition is likely to increase the virulence of their
views and their self-understanding of being treated unjustly by a legal order that they see as
coddling those whom they despise. Under these conditions, those whose speech the prohibitions
make illegal are likely to feel more increasingly justified in using any means – including violent
or illegal means – to pursue their values. Essentially, this is the point of Thomas Emerson’s
fourth, often neglected reason to protect free speech.27 Speech freedom, he argues, helps create a
balance between stability and change, which reduces the likelihood that pent-up anger, when
almost inevitably it eventually expresses itself, will be expressed with irrational violence. The
prediction is that even if speech prohibitions decrease the short term level of expression of the
forbidden views, they will increase the likelihood that those views will periodically be expressed
by violent outbreaks.
Fourth, prohibiting the expression of any values – even the most offensive views such as
expression that denies democratic values or calls for violent or illegal actions – in the context of
discourses where verbal responses are possible – is likely to reduce the democratic cultural selfunderstanding that conflicts are to be dealt as a political rather than violent struggle. This selfunderstanding, as suggested earlier, helps decrease the likelihood (without eliminating the
danger) that racism will be expressed in overt violence. This is basically Ralf Dahrendorf’s
vision that the idea of democracy is not to embody the naive goal to eliminate conflict but rather
to move society’s inevitable real conflicts from the plane of violence to the plane of politics.28
Fifth, a political program of enacting and enforcing hate speech prohibitions runs the
danger of diverting political energy from arguably more meaningful political responses to the
underlying causes of racism. Often the purveyors of racism have themselves experienced forms
of social or material discrimination (or deprivation) – and sometimes they even list their
depressed material condition as evidence justifying disparaging racist views. Changing these
material conditions is crucial. Though full consideration of the causes of racism is far beyond
the scope of this talk (and my understanding), social and material conditions, including those that
generate feelings of economic and social marginalization, are likely contexts in which racial
27
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resentment flourishes. Changing these conditions, combined with creating contexts that can
defuse racist attitudes, could make a significant difference to the likelihood of outbreaks of racial
violence as well as to the commonality of attitudes of racial hate. Though the prospects of
successful suppression of hate speech may not be good, may even exacerbate the problem, the
possibility of reducing (though probably not eliminating) underlying causes may be real.
Political energy should be devoted to this task.
Anti-censorship feminists made a similar point in debates about regulation of
pornography. Although their substantive views about pornography varied greatly, the anticensorship feminists were united both in the view that the existing social order operated to
oppress women in many spheres and that a strategy of trying to suppress pornography was a
misdirection of their political energy.29 Similarly, the more meaningful political responses to
racism include fighting racism within public discourse, referred to in the first point above, but
also efforts to change social conditions that generate the alienation of groups among which
racism flourishes. Equally important are policy endeavors aimed at integrating into the culture
and economy typical targets of racist oppression. Creation and effective enforcement of laws
prohibiting discrimination in employment and education, as well as affirmative recruitment or
subsidy of typical targets of racism, could help change the material conditions that create racial
oppression. The goal should be to change the material conditions that reflect, breed, and sustain
racial hatred.
As an example of wrongly directed energies, I have observed corporate leaders showing
their liberality by favoring suppression of hate speech (which, in any event, is not conducive to a
good business climate). They thereby seem to be (I expect are) caring people who as individuals
are opposed to racism. These same leaders, however, often oppose legal civil rights provisions
that would force their firms to take responsibility for lack of minorities in their work force or
discrimination against minorities on the job. It is hard to avoid the view that this politics favors
the superficial, and for these businesses, the inexpensive remedy over real material responses to
underlying social conditions that contribute to racism and racial subordination.30
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Finally, a prohibition on even a narrowly formulated category of hate speech embodies a
principle that will be hard to circumscribe. There are two problems here. First, these laws are
likely to be abused by those in power, who will often be able to characterize the speech or
politics of their opponents as amounting to hate speech or its equivalent. Consider possible
characterizations: that labor agitators ferment class hatred and, potentially, class violence;
lesbians ferment hatred of and violence against men; black nationalists make racist attacks on
whites, Algerians insult the French, . . . Nadine Strossen has argued that the typical use of laws
prohibiting hate speech or related offenses to honor, even if adopted to protect minority groups,
are most used to defend dominant groups and punish minority group members or suppress their
speech.31 Minorities in Ethiopia were punished under hate speech laws for their criticisms of
Ethiopia’s dominant ethnic group.32 That is, hate speech prohibitions have been continually used
to punish activists among oppressed groups for the criticism of dominant groups.
The second problem involves the slippery-slope both in application of these categories
and use of the justification. Any principle that allows restrictions on speech that preaches hate
will be hard to contain. Suppression of other ‘harmful’ speech to deal with other nasty problems
will seem similar. Few laws aiming to restrict speech cannot receive as a justification that the
law responds to real harms. But most laws restricting speech see application only or primarily
against marginal individuals and groups – the outsiders or dissenters who should be the primary
beneficiaries of speech protection.33 A real danger to free speech is that prohibitions on hate
speech, justified because of the serious harm the expression can causes, are likely to justify other
restrictions on the basis of arguments about other purported harms with the net effect of further
subordinating the disempowered.
Even without any certainty that the prohibitions will have meaningfully beneficial
effects, caution might at first seem to justify prohibitions of hate speech. If, however, the six
points listed here are right, that is precisely the wrong conclusion. Instead, if these points are
right, caution would accept the necessity of some real harms out of a realistic fear that
prohibitions would overall be counter productive and lead to even worse results. Those six
reasons were: (1) allowing and then combating hate speech discursively is the only real way to
31
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keep alive the understanding of the evil of racial hatred; (2) forcing hate speech underground
obscures the extent and location of the problem to which society must respond; (3) suppression
of hate speech is likely to increase racists’ sense of oppression and their willingness to express
their views violently; (4) suppression is likely to reduce the societal self-understanding that
democracy means not eliminating conflict through suppression – what Justice Jackson described
as the unanimity of the graveyard 34 – but rather moving conflict from the plane of violence to
the plane of politics; (5) legal prohibition and enforcement of laws against hate speech are likely
to divert political energies away from more effective and meaningful responses, especially those
directed at changing material conditions in which racism festers; (6) the principle justifying
prohibitions and the specific laws prohibiting hate speech are likely to be abused, creating a
slippery slope to results contrary to the needs of victims of racial hatred (including jailing the
subjects of racial hatred for their verbal responses) and to the needs of other marginalized
groups.

*

*

*

Thus, my fear is the precedent of punishing racial hate speech, even punishing loosely
defined genocidal speech, may itself contribute to tragedy. For example, as I understand the
facts, the International Tribunal’s conviction of Rwandan radio broadcasters for genocide based
on their speech, speech which was integrated into the actual practice of murder much like that of
the leader of a pack of gunmen who directs her subordinates as to whom to shoot, was proper
and would have been proper under the relevant U.S. free speech doctrine relating to intentional
creation of a clear and present danger of crime.35 The First Amendment does not protect a person
in using speech in an attempt to commit a crime.36 The speaker who gives orders to her
associated gunmen is properly treated as having participated in any murder they commit.
However, conviction for genocide of the Rwandan newspaper publisher, Hassan Ngeze, who
periodically published racist diatribes against his group’s traditional oppressors, while purporting

33
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to speak in defense of a historically subordinated group, under circumstances where the
traditionally subordinated group was apparently under armed attack by those oppressors, and
who published his views substantially before the occurrence of the genocidal murders, sets a
troubling precedent.37
As I see it, if cycles of oppression and societal violence are to be broken, a society
desperately needs to create a culture of open expression where all views, especially the most
extreme views, are openly expressed and debated. In contrast, legal prohibitions on racist speech
– to the they would (often did) exist where ‘needed’ but given how much and against whom
these laws most likely would be (or were) enforced – would not have prevented the occurrence
of the genocide in Rwanda or elsewhere. But the mere existence of International Tribunal’s
precedent of jailing this publisher is likely to be used – I have been told informally, has been
used – by those in power in African countries at a similar stage in the development of civil
society and of democracy, to suppress expression of opposition groups. The precedent might
even be used (or more accurately, ‘abused’) to justify punishment of ‘disrespectful’ or
‘inaccurate’ speech about those in power. The impact of this precedent on a nation, through its
impact on press freedom, can be hugely significant. Any consequent lack of free press will
contribute greatly to the likelihood of corruption in existing governments and to making any
replacements of ruling elites much more likely to come only through violence. If my fears are
right, the International Tribunal could have hardly given Africa a worse present.
My main pragmatic point, I suppose, is to doubt the validity of the hypothesis that a legal
prohibition of (necessarily only some) racist speech, speech which admittedly occurs in contexts
that produce genocidal results, would contribute to preventing such events. More specifically,
the empirical suppositions justifying this opposition to hate speech regulation are: 1) Speech
prohibitions will be ineffective. Contexts in which genocide practices occur are ones in which
enforcement of hate speech prohibitions will not occur and the development of such contexts
will not be effectively prevented by earlier attempts to legally suppress hate speech. Too many
bigoted practices and expressions will fly below the radar screen of any speech prohibitions. (2)
37
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Regulation of hate speech may affirmatively contribute to the rise of racist genocidal cultures or
polities. (3) A key though hardly the only element in the most effective strategy of preventing
the rise of such a culture or polity is to provide for more robust protection of speech.
As a concluding comment, I want to indicate awareness of the fact that hate speech
causes many real harms, many real injuries. Though I reject the conclusion, these injuries could
plausibly justify suppression of hate speech even if suppression were not a wise way to respond
the most dramatic evils of racism, For two reasons, this chapter does not address arguments for
suppression of hate speech based on these other injuries. First, much of the commentary
explaining America’s exceptionalism, its (purportedly) greater protection of speech, especially of
hate speech, involves Europe’s twentieth century close-up experience with fascism and the
holocaust. I wanted therefore in this chapter to rebut the suggestion that some countries have
reasons to restrict hate speech different from the reasons operable in the United States. Thus, I
needed to argue that this historical experience does not justify, whether or not it explains, a
purportedly different European evaluation of free speech. In this regard, I might note that the
single most defining element of the American experience, continually reflected in countless
aspects of American law, especially in our policy failures, is the legacy of African-American
slavery and the American civil war. Europe hardly has a monopoly on hate, on hate speech, or
on racism.
Second, though the arguments that racist speech causes real harms is surely right, that
point is hardly unique to racist speech. Real harms are caused by most speech that judges or
legislatures consider as possible bases for legal liability or punishment.38 Here is not the place to
discuss the point but one or both of the reasons given here to protect speech – either normative
views that protection is necessary to justify the legitimacy of the legal order or pragmatic
arguments about bad consequences of accepting the propriety of regulation – justifies a speech
protective stance despite the harms speech can and does cause. This is especially true given the
inevitable errors of identifying what speech causes greater harms than benefits and given the
inevitable chilling effect of speech regulation on valuable speech.
Justice Holmes argued that our theory of free speech ‘is an experiment, as all life is an
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experiment.’ It is a ‘wager … based on imperfect knowledge.’39 Given lack of adequate
evidence for any certainty about the guess whether suppression or freedom provides the best
security, I think wisdom requires that choice favor liberty. Liberty is the choice if people are
fundamentally good and worthy of respect – suppression is the choice if the opposite holds
factually. We are worthy of intellectual attention and concern only if the former is true. For this
reason, recognizing that the guess may turn out to wrong, I would rather have hazarded the guess
that justifies a concern with the circumstances and future of humanity. Only then would being
right in the guess matter. Moreover, I suspect, given that the answer is not writ in stone, that
guess can be a self-fulfilling prophesy. If so, it is clear which prophesy should be favored.
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